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OPINION OF THE COURT 
                     
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
 In this appeal, defendant, Edwin Velasquez, challenges 
the district court's exclusion of the expert witness he proffered 
to testify on his behalf on the subject of handwriting analysis 
and the lack of standards in that field of expertise.  Velasquez 
was convicted on six counts of drug related offenses, including 
Count VIII, engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise.  He 
appeals only his conviction on Count VIII.   
 At Velasquez's criminal trial, the Government relied 
upon a handwriting expert, Lynn Bonjour, to link two of 
Velasquez's accomplices to certain drug transactions.  As a part 
of his defense, Velasquez proposed to call Mark P. Denbeaux, a 
Professor of Law at Seton Hall University and an expert "critic" 
of the field of handwriting analysis, to assist the jury in 
understanding the limitations of the Government's handwriting 
testimony.  The district court refused to admit Professor 
Denbeaux's testimony.   
 In his appeal, Velasquez contends that, if Denbeaux's 
testimony had been admitted, the Government might not have 
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convinced the jury that Velasquez had managed or organized a 
continuing criminal enterprise involving at least five other 
people.  Velasquez asserts that Denbeaux's proposed testimony 
might have persuaded the jury to discount the testimony of Lynn 
Bonjour in which she identified the handwriting on two mailing 
labels as that of two of Velasquez's associates.  Because we find 
that Professor Denbeaux is qualified to testify as an expert on 
the limitations of handwriting analysis and because we conclude 
that the exclusion of his testimony may very well have affected 
the jury's verdict on Count VIII, we will reverse Velasquez's 
judgment of conviction on the continuing criminal enterprise 
offense and remand this case for a new trial on that count.0 
I.  BACKGROUND AND FACTS 
                                                           
0Because we are remanding, we will not go on to consider 
Velasquez's contention that the district court erred by 
permitting DEA Agent Gregory Thrash to testify regarding the 
manner in which cocaine is used and distributed and the manner in 
which drug organizations operate between the Virgin Islands and 
Florida.  In particular, Velasquez asserts that Thrash testified 
as an expert and that the Government failed to give the required 
notice of that testimony to the defense.   
 We conclude that parts of Thrash's testimony do appear 
to fall within the bounds of expert opinion.  He testified not 
just about the facts of this specific case but generally, from 
his experience, about drug trafficking organizations, including 
the persons required to perform different functions in such an 
organization.   
 At the time of the trial in 1991, however, the 
Government was not required to give notice of its expert 
witnesses.  Although Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
16(a)(1)(E) was amended to require such notice in 1993, even the 
amended rule requires the Government to give such notice only 
"[a]t the defendant's request."  Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E). In 
this appeal, Velasquez fails to allege that he made such a 
request.  
 If, at the time of retrial, the defense should request 
notification of expert witnesses, the Government will have the 
opportunity to give such notice in a timely manner. 
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 Edwin Velasquez was charged with eight counts of 
criminal activity related to narcotics trafficking:  Count I -
conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 845, 846 and 963; Count II - possession 
of a controlled substance with intent to distribute in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); Count III - possession of a controlled 
substance on board an aircraft departing from the United States 
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 955 and 963; Count IV - importation 
of a controlled substance into the custom territory of the United 
States in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a) and 963; Count V -
possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); Count VI - simple possession 
of a firearm in violation of V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 2253(a); 
Count VII - engaging in monetary transactions in property derived 
from specified unlawful activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 
and 1957(a); and Count VIII - engaging in a continuing criminal 
enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848.   
 During a five-day jury trial, the Government called 
Lynn Bonjour to testify as an expert on handwriting analysis.0 
                                                           
0Ms. Bonjour's qualifications are extensive.  At the time of the 
trial, Ms. Bonjour was employed as a Forensic Document Analyst 
with the U.S. Postal Inspection Service and had been so employed 
for fourteen and one half years.  In conjunction with her 
employment, the Postal Inspection Service had certified her as an 
expert in the field of document analysis.  Previously, she had 
been employed by the U.S. Treasury Department, Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco and Firearms as a Document Analyst/Document Analyst 
Trainee for four years.  App. 125.  In addition to her on-the-job 
training, Ms. Bonjour had attended courses and seminars 
throughout the country on handwriting identification and related 
subjects, including classes at Georgetown University and George 
Washington University and courses with the Secret Service and 
FBI.  She was a member of the Mid-Atlantic Association of 
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Defense counsel immediately objected to the admissibility of her 
testimony, contending that handwriting analysis lacked measurable 
standards and could not be considered a legitimate science. 
Following voir dire examination on the admissibility of Ms. 
Bonjour's testimony, the trial court rejected the defense's 
arguments that handwriting analysis did not constitute a valid 
field of scientific expertise.  In so doing, the court relied, in 
part, on Ms. Bonjour's testimony regarding the standards and 
methodology of handwriting analysis.0   
 The court then permitted Ms. Bonjour to testify as an 
expert in the field of questioned documents/handwriting analysis. 
App. 138.  Ms. Bonjour testified that, in her opinion, both 
Velasquez's girlfriend, Glenda Arrindell, and one of his alleged 
accomplices, Walter McKay, had written a mailing label which had 
been used to ship drugs.  App. 144, 171. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Forensic Scientists and a past president of the Questioned 
Document section of that organization.  She has testified as a 
handwriting expert in approximately 100 court cases in twenty-six 
different states.  
0Ms. Bonjour described the procedures that she, and other experts 
in the field of handwriting analysis, employ as follows: First, 
the expert determines whether a questioned document contains a 
sufficient amount of writing and enough individual 
characteristics to permit identification.  After determining that 
the questioned document is identifiable, the expert examines the 
submitted handwriting specimens in the same manner.  If both the 
questioned document and the specimens contain sufficient 
identifiable characteristics, then the expert compares those 
characteristics, e.g., the slant of the writing, the shapes of 
the letters, the letter connections, the height of letters, the 
spacing between letters, the spacing between words, the "i" dots 
and "t" crosses, etc.  App. 136.  After making these comparisons, 
the expert weighs the evidence, considering both the similarities 
and differences in the handwriting and determines whether or not 
there is a match.   
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 To counter Ms. Bonjour, the defense proferred Mark P. 
Denbeaux, a Professor of Law at Seton Hall University, to testify 
on two facets of handwriting analysis:  as a critic of the field 
of handwriting analysis or, in the alternative, as a handwriting 
analyst himself.  At the voir dire examination to determine the 
admissibility of Denbeaux's testimony, he opined that handwriting 
analysis is not a valid field of scientific expertise because it 
lacks standards to guide experts in weighing the match or non-
match of particular handwriting characteristics.  App. 189-194. 
By way of example, Denbeaux pointed out that Ms. Bonjour had 
relied on spacing characteristics (the spacing between lines) to 
match Velasquez's accomplices with the shipping labels but had 
failed to consider or explain why other non-matching aspects of 
spacing (e.g., how the writing was located on the page both 
vertically and horizontally, indentation, etc.) were not relevant 
or as persuasive in forming her opinion.  App. 205. 
 The district court refused to permit Professor Denbeaux 
to testify either as to the limitations of handwriting analysis 
generally or as to the limitations of Ms. Bonjour's particular 
opinions concerning this case.  The court explained that "whether 
or not handwriting expertise is admissible in a courtroom" is a 
"legal" question that was resolved against the defense when the 
court permitted Ms. Bonjour to testify as a qualified expert in 
the field of handwriting analysis.  App. 182; see also Court's 
Order and Memorandum, App. 31-34 (Because the court found "that 
there are standard procedures in the field of handwriting 
7 
analysis, it refused to admit the testimony of Professor Denbeaux 
to contradict the court's legal conclusion."). 
 The defense then sought to have Professor Denbeaux 
qualified as an expert in handwriting analysis so that he could 
compare the mailing labels with the handwriting specimens and 
offer his opinion regarding the authorship of the labels.  Again, 
the court refused to allow Professor Denbeaux to testify.  In 
particular, the court relied on the Professor's lack of formal 
training and inadequate practical experience in performing 
handwriting analysis.  Although the record reflects that the 
Professor had considerable knowledge of the field of handwriting 
analysis,0 he had never undertaken formal training in handwriting 
analysis, had never been to a seminar on the subject, and had 
never been a member of any related professional organization.  In 
addition, Denbeaux had "never been retained to give an opinion 
about authorship."  App. 201.  Although on approximately 12 
occasions, he had compared handwriting exemplars for the purposes 
                                                           
0Professor Denbeaux testified that he had conducted eight years 
of self-directed research on handwriting analysis, during which 
he had read nearly all of the literature on the subject; had 
spent four years as a statistical social scientist; had been 
involved in some capacity regarding handwriting analysis in 
approximately four court cases; had been named an American Bar 
Association Fellow for his research related to the creation of a 
testing mechanism to certify handwriting analysts and validate 
the accuracy of their identifications; and had collaborated with 
two co-authors to publish a work challenging the entire field of 
handwriting analysis based on the lack of empirical testing, 
selectively chosen premises, and inadequate standards and 
procedures, see D. Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux, & Michael 
J. Saks, Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: 
The Lessons of Handwriting Identification "Expertise", 137 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 731 (1989). 
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of making his own identifications, none of these comparisons had 
been independently corroborated for accuracy.  App. 213. 
 At the end of the trial, the jury convicted Velasquez 
on Counts I, II, III, IV, VI and VIII.  The court declared a 
mistrial as to Counts V and VII.  On July, 10, 1992, Velasquez 
was sentenced to 292 months imprisonment, a $250 special 
assessment and a $25,000 fine.  Almost two years later, on May 
16, 1994, the court reduced Velasquez's term of imprisonment to 
180 months and five years of supervised release, in recognition 
of cooperation with the government.  
 Velasquez has appealed only his conviction on Count 
VIII, illegally engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise 
involving at least five people other than himself.  He contests 
the district court's exclusion of Professor Denbeaux's testimony 
criticizing the field of handwriting analysis.  Velasquez claims 
that, if Professor Denbeaux had been permitted to testify, the 
jury might not have accepted Ms. Bonjour's testimony which was 
essential in connecting two of the necessary five persons to 
Velasquez's drug operations.0 
 Although Velasquez did not file a formal notice of 
appeal, he sent a letter to the district court judge shortly 
                                                           
0Because the limited record on appeal does not expressly identify 
the number of people involved in the criminal enterprise, we 
assume that Ms. Bonjour's testimony connecting these two 
participants with the Defendant's criminal activities was 
necessary to obtain Defendant's conviction on Count VIII of the 
indictment, which required that the Defendant occupy a position 
of control in a ongoing criminal enterprise involving five or 
more individuals.  See 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982).  This assumption 
is bolstered by the Government's failure to allege otherwise in 
its brief to this Court. 
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after his sentencing on July 13, 1992, challenging his 
conviction.  In October of 1992, he requested that the district 
court treat his July 13, 1992, letter as notice of appeal or, in 
the alternative, as a motion to file a notice of appeal out of 
time.  The district court granted his motion on March 31, 1993, 
and he filed his notice of appeal with this Court on April 5, 
1993.  We have jurisdiction over his appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 We review the trial court's ruling on the admissibility 
of Professor Denbeaux's testimony for abuse of discretion, "`but 
to the extent the district court's ruling turns on an 
interpretation of a Federal Rule of Evidence our review is 
plenary.'"  In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 
749 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting DeLuca v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 944 (3d Cir. 1990)), cert. 
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1253 (1995) ("Paoli II").  We review the 
district court's findings of fact under a clearly erroneous 
standard.  Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local 19 v. 2300 
Group, Inc., 949 F.2d 1274, 1278 (3d Cir. 1991). 
III.  DISCUSSION 
 The district court refused to admit Professor 
Denbeaux's testimony criticizing the lack of standards in the 
field of handwriting analysis because the court had already 
concluded that expert testimony concerning handwriting analysis 
evidence was sufficiently reliable to be admitted pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702.  We believe, however, that, even 
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though the district court had recognized handwriting analysis as 
a field of expertise, the court erred as a matter of law in 
denying the defense the opportunity to criticize the standards 
employed in that field of expertise.0   Professor Denbeaux's 
testimony as a critic of handwriting analysis would have assisted 
the jury in evaluating the Government's expert witness.  In 
excluding Denbeaux's critique, the court ignored the fact that 
the same considerations that inform the court's legal decision to 
admit evidence under Rule 702 may also influence the factfinder's 
determination as to what weight such evidence, once admitted, 
should receive.  The Government conceded as much, stating that 
evidence that handwriting analysis is not scientifically credible 
"goes to [the] weight" that such handwriting evidence should 
receive.  App. 123.  The district court even acknowledged, in its 
preliminary consideration of the admissibility of Ms. Bonjour's 
expert testimony, that Professor Denbeaux's proposed criticism of 
                                                           
0In his opening brief to this Court, Velasquez also challenges 
the district court's refusal to qualify Professor Denbeaux as an 
expert in conducting handwriting analysis.  In his reply brief, 
however, Velasquez recants this argument, stating unequivocally 
that "Professor Denbeaux is not an expert in the identification 
of questioned writings."  Reply Br. at 1; see also Reply Br. at 
n.1 ("Trial Court erroneously understood that Professor Denbeaux 
was being put forward as an handwriting expert").  Because of 
this concession, we need not address the issue of whether 
Professor Denbeaux was qualified to testify as to his ability -or 
inability - to identify the handwriting on the exemplars 
proferred by the Government.  We note, however, that there 
appears to be a close link between the ability, or not, of an 
expert generally to recognize the characteristics of handwriting 
which are described as helpful in identifying the scrivener of an 
exemplar and the ability, or not, of an expert in a specific case 
to identify the scrivener of a particular document through the 
recognition of those same characteristics.  
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the lack of standards in handwriting analysis might go "to the 
weight" of the Bonjour testimony.  App. 133.   
 The axiom is well recognized:  the reliability of 
evidence goes "more to the weight than to the admissibility of 
the evidence."  See, e.g.,  United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 
786, 800 (2d Cir. 1992) ("DNA profiling evidence should be 
excluded only when the government cannot show [a] threshold level 
of reliability in its data. . . . [T]he court in exercising its 
discretion should be mindful that this issue should go more to 
the weight than to the admissibility of the evidence."), cert. 
denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992).  Because Professor Denbeaux's 
proffered testimony called into doubt the reliability and 
credibility of Lynn Bonjour's handwriting testimony, the jury 
should have been permitted to hear his testimony in order to 
properly weigh the testimony of Ms. Bonjour.   
 If the jury had had the opportunity to credit 
Denbeaux's testimony, criticizing handwriting analysis in general 
and Ms. Bonjour's testimony in particular, the jury might have 
discounted Ms. Bonjour's testimony and thereby found that the 
Government had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Velasquez's continuing criminal enterprise involved at least five 
other people -- a necessary element of his conviction on Count 
VIII.  Thus, we hold that the district court's determination on 
the admissibility of Ms. Bonjour's handwriting analysis testimony 
should not be permitted to preclude the jury from hearing other 
relevant evidence attacking the reliability of her testimony.   
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 Our conclusion that Professor Denbeaux's expert 
testimony was admissible is consistent with the "strong and 
undeniable preference for admitting any evidence having some 
potential for assisting the trier of fact" which is embodied in 
the Federal rules of Evidence.  DeLuca v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 956 (3d Cir. 1990).  Rule 
702, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, 
specifically embraces this policy.  See Fed. R. Evid. 702 
advisory committee's note (expert testimony should be admissible 
if it will assist trier of fact); Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 741 (Rule 
702 has "liberal policy of admissibility").   
 Rule 702 has three major requirements:  (1) the 
proffered witness must be an expert; (2) the expert must testify 
to scientific, technical or specialized knowledge; and (3) the 
expert's testimony must assist the trier of fact.0  Paoli II, 35 
F.3d at 741-42.  Because Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) requires 
district courts to make preliminary determinations "concerning 
the qualification of a person to be a witness, [and] . . . the 
admissibility of evidence," a district court, when faced with a 
proffer of expert testimony, must make a preliminary 
determination as to all of these elements of Rule 702.  See 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796 
(1993) ("Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, . . 
                                                           
0Rule 702 provides:  "If scientific, technical or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified 
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise."  Fed. R. Evid. 702.   
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. the trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 
104(a), whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) 
scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to 
understand or determine a fact in issue.") (footnotes omitted). 
These preliminary determinations are intended to ensure the 
reliability of the expert testimony as well as its relevance. Id. 
at 2795; Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237.  
 The first requirement of Rule 702 -- that the proposed 
witness be an expert -- has been liberally construed by this 
Court.  Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 741.  "We have held that a broad 
range of knowledge, skills, and training qualify an expert as 
such," and have "eschewed imposing overly rigorous requirements 
of expertise."  Id.; see also Hammond v. International Harvester 
Co., 691 F.2d 646, 653 (3d Cir. 1982) (permitting engineer with 
sales experience in automotive and agricultural equipment, who 
also taught high school automobile repair, to testify in products 
liability action involving tractors).   
 The second requirement of Rule 702 -- that the expert 
testify to scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge -
- is intended to ensure the reliability or trustworthiness of the 
expert's testimony.  Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795-96.   
 In Daubert, the Supreme Court held that a district 
court, when presented with a proffer of expert "scientific" 
testimony, must make a "preliminary assessment of whether the 
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is 
scientifically valid," by considering all relevant factors that 
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may bear on the reliability of the proffered evidence.0  113 S. 
Ct. at 2796-97; Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 742.  Scientific evidence is 
deemed sufficiently reliable if the expert has "good grounds" for 
his or her testimony, i.e., the expert's opinions are "based on 
the `methods and procedures of science' rather than on 
`subjective belief or unsupported speculation.'"  Paoli II, 35 
F.3d at 742 (quoting Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795).  We have 
cautioned, however, against applying the reliability requirement 
too strictly, explaining that "the reliability requirement must 
not be used as a tool by which the court excludes all 
questionably reliable evidence.  The ultimate touchstone [of 
admissibility] is helpfulness to the trier of fact."  Id. at 744 
(internal quotations and citation omitted). 
 The third requirement of Rule 702 is to ensure that the 
evidence is relevant or "fits" under the facts of the case. 
Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795-96.  There must be a valid connection 
between the expertise in question and the inquiry being made in 
the case.  Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 743.  When dealing with 
"scientific" evidence, this element is satisfied if there is a 
                                                           
0Courts should consider the following suggested factors, in 
addition to any other applicable factors, in making a preliminary 
determination regarding the reliability of scientific testimony:  
(1) whether a method consists of a testable hypothesis; 
(2) whether the method has been subject to peer review; 
(3) the known or potential rate of error; (4) the 
existence and maintenance of standards controlling the 
technique's operation; (5) whether the method is 
generally accepted; (6) the relationship of the 
technique to methods which have been established to be 
reliable; (7) the qualifications of the expert witness 
testifying based on the methodology; and (8) the non-
judicial uses to which the method has been put. 
Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 742 n.8.  
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"connection between the scientific research or test result to be 
presented, and particular disputed factual issues in the case." 
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985); see 
also Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 742-43.   
 Is it, however, appropriate to apply the Daubert tests 
for scientific expert testimony to the field of handwriting 
analysis?  The Daubert tests have been considered by some courts 
to be too stringent to employ in considering whether to admit the 
expert testimony of accountants and construction experts.  See 
Iacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d 
Cir. 1994) (Daubert clarified standards for evaluating scientific 
knowledge only and, therefore, does not apply to exclude 
affidavits of geotechnical and underground-construction experts 
who were retained to summarize and interpret voluminous, 
technical data); Tamarin v. Adam Caterers, Inc., 13 F.3d 51, 53 
(accountant's affidavit summarizing his review of payroll records 
not inadmissible under Daubert because "that case specifically 
dealt with the admissibility of scientific evidence"); United 
States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1040-41 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995) (Daubert factors of testability, known error rate, peer 
review and publication, and general acceptance not applicable to 
determination of admissibility of testimony by forensic document 
examiner; "Daubert does not impose any new standard, other than 
what is found in the text of the Federal Rules of Evidence, for 
the admissibility of the testimony of nonscientific experts such 
as harbor pilots or real estate appraisers.").  However, in an 
exercise of caution, we will review Denbeaux's testimony under 
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the Daubert tests because those tests are helpful to assist us in 
our consideration of the expertise in question here.  We will 
therefore examine both Lynn Bonjour's and Prof. Denbeaux's 
testimony for qualifications, reliability and fitness as those 
factors have been explicated in Daubert.  
 In the present case, there is no question that the 
district court properly admitted Ms. Bonjour's handwriting 
analysis testimony because her testimony met all three of the 
requirements of Rule 702.  See Government of Virgin Islands v. 
Sanes, 57 F.3d 338 (3d cir. 1995) (approving district court's 
decision to admit testimony of professor of linguistics on issues 
of voice identification).  First, Ms. Bonjour is clearly 
experienced in handwriting analysis.  Her qualifications in this 
regard are extensive, including her more than fourteen years of 
experience as a Forensic Document Analyst for the U.S. Postal 
Inspection Service.  See supra note 2. 
 Second, the field of handwriting analysis consists of 
"scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge" properly 
the subject of expert testimony under Rule 702.  The district 
court held a hearing at which it made the requisite preliminary 
finding that the methodology underlying handwriting analysis was 
valid and applicable to the facts of the present case.  In 
particular, the court questioned Ms. Bonjour as follows: 
COURT:  Is [there] a standard methodology 
when you look at a handwriting specimen? 
 
BONJOUR:  Yes. 
 
COURT:  Give me a little discussion of what 
you look for in your analysis. . . . 
17 
 
BONJOUR:  First I look at the questioned 
writing and look at that to determine whether 
it's identifiable, whether it has sufficient 
individual characteristics as opposed to 
class characteristics.  So that it can be 
identified.  Whether there is a sufficient 
amount of the writing for a comparison.  And, 
once I determine whether or not it is 
identifiable, then I look at the submitted 
handwriting specimens for the same purposess 
[sic], to determine whether they have been 
naturally written, whether they contain 
identifiable characteristics, individual 
characteristics.  I then compare the 
characteristics. 
 
COURT:  What do you mean by characteristics? 
 
BONJOUR:  Characteristics are the, [sic] 
slant, the shapes of the letters, the letter 
connections, the height of the letters, the 
spacing between letters, spacing between 
words, the i dots, t crosses.  Every single 
thing in that writing is a characteristic. 
They, in order to effect an identification, 
they have to be demonstrated and if they do 
not match exactly, I have to have a good 
reason for why they don't. . . .  Once I have 
made the comparison, I weigh the evidence I 
have seen and determine whether or not this 
is a match or probably a match or I don't 
know or it is not a match. 
 
COURT:  Is this the protocol you follow in 
every instance? 
 
BONJOUR:  In every instance. 
 
COURT:  To your knowledge, in your 
association with other people who are in your 
field, is this the protocol they follow? 
 
BONJOUR:  Yes, it is. 
App. 136-37.  Immediately following this colloquy, the Court 
admitted Ms. Bonjour as an expert in the field of questioned 
documents, i.e., handwriting analysis.  App. 138.  We agree with 
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the district court that Ms. Bonjour's proposed testimony 
concerned "scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge" 
and was sufficiently reliable to be admissible.   
 Ms. Bonjour's testimony also satisfied the third 
requirement -- that the expert's testimony assist the trier of 
fact.  Her testimony, comparing the handwriting of Velasquez's 
accomplices with the handwriting on the mailing labels used to 
ship drugs, was of assistance to the jury in determining whether 
the accomplices had written the labels, a fact at issue in this 
case.  Specifically, Ms. Bonjour's testimony, if credited by the 
jury, linked two people to Defendant's drug activities where one 
of the issues at trial was whether Defendant had managed or 
organized a continuing criminal enterprise involving at least 
five other persons.  Accordingly, the district court correctly 
admitted Ms. Bonjour's expert testimony on handwriting analysis 
under Rule 702. 
 Similarly, Professor Denbeaux's proffered testimony 
meets all three requirements of Rule 702.  First, in light of our 
liberal interpretation of expertise, the record shows that 
Professor Denbeaux has sufficient specialized knowledge of the 
limitations of handwriting analysis to be considered an expert in 
that regard.  See Downing, 753 F.2d at 1229-30 (expert testimony 
on limitations of eyewitness perception and memory may under 
certain circumstances satisfy helpfulness test of Rule 702).  In 
particular, we point to the Professor's eight years of self-
directed research on handwriting analysis and his co-authorship 
of a law review article on the subject.  See supra note 3.  The 
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mere fact that the Professor is not an expert in conducting 
handwriting analysis to identify particular scriveners of 
specified documents does not mean that he is not qualified to 
offer expert testimony criticizing the standards in the field.   
 Second, the Professor's proposed testimony criticizing 
handwriting analysis consisted of "scientific, technical or other 
specialized knowledge" reliable enough to be admitted under Rule 
702.  The Professor criticized the lack of standards and the 
possibility for error involved in handwriting analysis.  These 
criticisms could be and, on a limited basis have been, tested; 
they have been published and subjected to peer review.  See D. 
Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux, & Michael J. Saks, Exorcism 
of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of 
Handwriting Identification "Expertise", 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 731 
(1989) (detailing tests conducted to determine accuracy of 
handwriting analysts).0  We find that sufficient evidence exists 
to show that the Professor had "good grounds" for his rejection 
of handwriting analysis.  
 Finally, the Professor's proffered testimony was highly 
relevant to the reliability of Ms. Bonjour's testimony.  His 
criticisms of the field of handwriting analysis generally, as 
well as Ms. Bonjour's analysis in this case, would have assisted 
the jury in determining the proper weight to accord Ms. Bonjour's 
testimony.  His testimony "fits" the facts of the case because 
                                                           
0Ms. Bonjour acknowledged that she had read Professor Denbeaux's 
law review article, although her critique -- "it's a lot of 
gibberish" -- was less than glowing.  App. 164. 
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his opinions, criticizing handwriting analysis and Ms. Bonjour's 
conclusions, connect to the issue of whether Defendant's 
continuing criminal enterprise involved at least five other 
people.  
 Thus, in light of the liberal standard of admissibility 
of Rule 702, Professor Denbeaux's testimony should have been 
admitted.  Moreover, because his testimony bore on the critical 
issue of Ms. Bonjour's identification of the persons who were 
required to have participated in Velasquez's "continuing criminal 
enterprise," his testimony might very well have affected the 
jury's verdict on Count VIII.  We cannot conclude that the 
district court's decision to exclude that evidence was harmless 
error.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 The district court erred as a matter of law in refusing 
to permit Professor Denbeaux to testify as to the limitations of 
handwriting analysis.  Accordingly, we will vacate Velasquez's 
judgment of conviction for engaging in a continuing criminal 
enterprise, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848, and we will remand 
this case to the district court for a new trial on that count. 
 
